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Bayles: Introduction: The Purposes of Contract Law

INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSES OF
CONTRACT LAW
MICHAEL D. BAYLES*

In recent years, interest in the theory of contract law has increased. Many articles and several recent books have developed
philosophical or jurisprudential perspectives on contract law.1 This
introduction aims to place the major views in perspective by considering what theories might try to do and briefly outlining the major approaches to the central questions of contract law. The theories
cannot be developed in detail.
THE FUNCTIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY

Gerald Fridman begins his paper in this symposium by suggesting that lawyers and philosophers may have different purposes
in examining contract law. Philosophers, he suggests, are often concerned to examine the language of lawyers about contracts or the
ethical and other reasons for recognizing and enforcing contracts,
while lawyers are concerned to determine whether a legally binding
arrangement has been made. Fridman is correct to note that
theories of contract law can be developed for different purposes, and
he is perhaps correct about the usual emphases of philosophers and
lawyers. However, it is better to note the different functions a
theory of contract law can have without identifying these functions
with one or another group of theorists.
At least three distinct functions can be served by a theory of
contract (or other part of) law: prediction, explanation, or justification. Most theories seek to serve all these functions but differ in the
relative emphasis they place on them. Fridman implicitly ascribes
the function of prediction to lawyers -to determine whether a legally enforceable arrangement has been made. Doing this primarily involves predicting what courts would do were they confronted with
the arrangement. Lawyers, however, usually want to do more than
predict what courts will do; they want to be able to draft arrangements and make presentations that will persuade courts to en-
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force them. Consequently, a predictive function is often best fulfilled
by stating the theory in the terminology courts use. Due to the doctrine of precedent, judges usually at least state their decisions in
terminology of previous cases. Unless one is a total cynic about
judicial behavior, one can reasonably expect to influence their decisions by arguments framed in that terminology. Consequently, if the
primary function of a theory is predictive (and persuasive), it is likely to be stated in standard legal terminology, drawing heavily on
the reasons and language of appellate court opinions.
A second function of contract theory is to explain. Explaining is
not the same as predicting. The view that explanations and predictions are symmetrical has largely been abandoned in philosophy of
science. It is even more obvious that they are not the same in law.
While the doctrine of freedom of contract might have been a good
basis for explaining court decisions in the early twentieth century, it
would have been a poor basis for predicting future developments of
contract law.
Explanations can occur on at least two different levels. At the
first level, a theory might seek to increase understanding of how
various court decisions fit together and how the law develops. Explanations of this sort may be closely tied to the type of prediction
discussed above. By classifying cases under various legal doctrines,
one can see how they fit together and predict how new cases will be
decided. However, insofar as explanations are based on past cases,
they might not be reliable guides to future decisions. Judges change
their minds, new judges with different views are appointed, and the
law develops. Nonetheless, the doctrine of precedent works to
preserve the same general rationale and pattern of decisions, so one
can often perceive developing trends and extrapolate them into the
future.
Explanation can also be sought at a second level-that of understanding the role of contracts and contract law in society. While explanations of the first level are likely to stick closely to the principles enunciated by courts, explanations at this second level are
much less likely to do so. Instead, they are apt to draw on economic,
sociological, and historical perspectives. The terminology is likely to
be that of the social sciences. The explanations are likely to be by
causes rather than by reasons as on the first level. If one can identify underlying causes and trends, then predictions can be made.
However, because the explanations are by causes rather than
reasons, explanations of this second level are less likely than those
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of the first level to provide practicing lawyers persuasive arguments
to use in court.
A third function of contract theory is justification. The aim is
to justify contract decisions, doctrines, and principles. Because explanations of human conduct often indicate its significance for individuals and society, justification can be closely tied to explanation.
Nonetheless, to explain is not to justify, so justification will often involve indicating that elements of contract law are not the best and
should be revised or reformed. Some theorists assume that the bulk
of contract law must be justified; that any theory that implied the
bulk of contract law is unjustified must be mistaken. This approach
corresponds to a common approach to ethical theory in which the
aim is to formulate general principles that will account for and
systematize strongly held moral beliefs, such as that torture, lying,
and breaking promises are wrong. Here is not the place to discuss
the appropriateness of this method, but one should realize that with
it justification will only result in incremental revision. Radical
reform cannot be developed.
Although the functions of prediction, explanation, and justification are often related to one another and most theories seek to
fulfill all three, they are not identical and can lead in opposite directions. An explanation of a doctrine may indicate that it is simply not
justified. Moreover, explanation and prediction do not necessarily go
together. Consequently, one must determine which function is
predominant in a theory one examines or constructs. Often, strong
disagreement between theories or their proponents stems from
unrecognized differences in emphasis on functions.
THE QUESTIONS AND TRADITIONAL ANSWERS

In a contract action, the plaintiff needs to show that there was
a contract imposing a duty to the plaintiff on the defendant, that the
defendant breached that duty, and that a particular legal response
(usually the payment of damages) is appropriate. Traditional contract law had (and to some extent still has) several doctrines surrounding each of these elements that often made it hard for plaintiffs to prove their cases. It is useful to briefly note them. Proving
the existence of a contract was (and is) often difficult. First, there
had to be an offer specifying all the major terms and acceptance of
that precise offer. If a business sent an offer on its printed form to
purchase 1000 widgets from another firm, which accepted the offer
on its printed form, a contract might not have existed. The accept-

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983

616

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 1
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

ance form would probably not have the identical conditions as the
original offer form. Second, the existence of a contract required consideration -something provided in exchange for the promise. Standardly this might be paying money or a promise to do something in
return. Later the law came to also recognize detrimental reliance,
for example, taking a lost dog to its owner in response to an advertisement offering to pay a reward for the dog's return.
Once a plaintiff establishes that a contract exists, the plaintiff
still has to prove that under the contract the defendant owed a duty
to him or her. Historically, courts were strongly inclined to restrict
duties to those expressly stated in the contract. The parol evidence
rule rarely permitted verbal evidence of promises not included in a
written document. Moreover, the doctrine of privity restricted
duties to the other parties to the contract. If a person bought an
item for another person to use, the seller had no duty to the second
person because that person was not a party to the contract. Over
time the courts have relaxed these stringent rules, often implying
promises in contracts and making exceptions to the parol evidence
and privity rules.
Generally, showing that the defendant breached the duty has
not been a major focus of court cases. It is often clear that the
defendant did or did not do something, for example, complete construction of a barn. The issue is most likely to be disputed when the
defendant's duty requires conduct meeting some standard, for example, supplying merchandise that is fit for normal use or building a
house that meets construction standards.
Finally, the plaintiff must show that a certain legal response is
appropriate. The general principle is that contract damages should
place a plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the
defendant performed as specified in the contract. The plaintiff is
supposed to receive his or her "expectation interest" - what the
plaintiff expected to make from the deal. Three important rules
have limited these damages. First, the plaintiff is required to mitigate damages by trying to secure substitute performance. Second,
damages are also limited to those the defendant should have foreseen as likely to result from his or her breach. Third, penal damages
are not awarded; the purpose of damages is simply to compensate
the plaintiff.
Courts do not generally award specific performance. By trial
time the performance would often not be of benefit to the plaintiff;
indeed, the rule requiring .plaintiffs to mitigate damages increases
the likelihood of this being so. In a few cases, courts will order
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specific performance, usually when something unique is involved,
such as the transfer of land or of a unique art object.
The traditional rules of contract law yielded haish results in
many situations. The difficulties of the parol evidence and privity
rules were mentioned above. Perhaps the most difficult aspect, and
one not yet fully resolved, stems from the concept of contractual
duties. If no contract exists, then no duty exists and contract law is
necessarily silent. For example, if because of mutual mistake no contract exists, then a plaintiff has no contractual recourse no matter
how much he or she may have expended. The courts did and do in
fact usually provide remedies, but conceptually they are not considered to be in contract. On the other hand, if a contractual duty
does exist, then the defendant is liable for full contractual damages.
Today, however, courts often manage to provide lesser damages (the
plaintiff's reliance interest) if full damagesi would be inappropriate.
RECENT' THEORIES

Although recent theories of contract law differ in the extent to
which they retain or coincide with traditional contract law, on the
whole they find the extant contract law acceptable. The following
discussion emphasizes their conception of the purpose of contract
behavior and law and briefly indicates some of' their implications for
answers to the three central questions: When does a contract exist
and impose a duty? What constitutes breach of a contract? What
legal remedy is appropriate?
Agreement and Promise
One type of recent contract theory takes agreement or promise
as the central element. This type of theory has a long history and
many variations which cannot be considered here. The paper by
Gerald Fridman in this syposium sketches an agreement theory. The
primary purpose of contract law, he contends, is to enforce the
agreement of the parties. For there to be a contract, substantial
agreement must exist and the parties must have freely intended to
be legally bound. In interpreting contracts, courts are primarily trying to carry out the intent of the parties. A breach occurs when one
party foils the intentions of the other party. The breaching party
can then be held to pay damages for consequences of the breach
that were foreseeable at the time the agreement was made. In
short, throughout, the purpose of contract law is to carry out the intentions of the contractors, including the payment of damages in
case of failure to perform.
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A similar yet distinct view advanced by Charles Fried holds
that the purpose of contract law is to enforce promises. In making a
contract, one .invokes the practice or convention of promising, which
provides a way of getting others to trust one to perform in the
future. Once one has done so, it is wrong not to fulfill one's promise
for the reasons Kant gave, namely, it violates trust and exhibits
disrespect for the other person.' On this view, if things go awry and
no contract is made, then the promise principle does not provide a
basis for relief. Instead, other principles apply, such as the principle
of benefit which requires compensating others for non-gift benefits
received from them.' In general, expectation damages are appropriate for breach of contract, because they provide the benefits
the plaintiff was promised.
Pill Ardal in his paper in this symposium presents an argument that, if correct, undermines Fried's account. Ardal contends
that no prima facie obligation to keep promises exists (thus undercutting the moral basis of Fried's promise principle). Promises are
symbolic acts involving a commitment to the realization of what is
promised. As such, nothing inherent in them supports their being
kept. Whether promises should be kept depends on their content
and the interests of the promisor and promisee. Moreover, implicit
promises, a favorite way for judges to achieve fair decisions, are not
really promises at all. Ardal illustrates the implications of his view
by considering an actual case.
The differences between Fridman's agreement and Fried's promise theories are subtle. As Fridman notes, on his view all contracts
involve promises, but not all promises imply contracts. Fried would
agree. The central difference between them appears to concern what
makes contracts binding. On Fridman's view, it is the agreement (intention) of the parties to be legally bound. On Fried's view, promises
are morally binding and courts enforce some but not all of them to
maintain trust in society and the freedom of individuals to determine the major aspects of their lives.
The theories of Fridman and Fried are both close to traditional
contract law doctrines. That is, the terminology and statements are
close to those found in judicial opinions. Moreover, they both emphasize the freedom of people to make arrangements as they desire.
Indeed, Fried greatly emphasizes the importance of contract law in
enabling individuals to maximize their freedom by making specific
2.
3.

C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 25.
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arrangements for the future. Both views also confront the difficulties of traditional contract law when no contract is found to exist. Fried refers such problems to other parts of the law, such as
restitution.
In this respect, both views appear unable to explain much of
the law surrounding contracts. The inability to explain these matters within the framework of contract theory might not bother
Fried, for he does not appear to seek to explain as much as to
justify contract law. He claims to show that the promise principle is
the moral basis of contract law.' Although he also hopes to explain
contract law, he wants to explain it on a moral basis. Although Fridman appears to take prediction as primary, he is more concerned
with explanation than Fried is. Indeed, he might plausibly contend
that one advantage of his view over the promise view is that it can
explain more of contract law.
Economic Analysis
In contrast to the agreement and promise theories, the economic
theory of contract law primarily emphasizes the explanatory function of theory. Moreover, the aim is to explain contract law at the
second level. It is not strongly argued that the language of judicial
opinions explicitly conforms to the theory, although it is often urged
that judicial language is not incompatible with it. Like the agreement and promise theories, however, the economic theory takes the
freedom to contract to be important. The freedom is not important
for the sake of the autonomy or freedom of individuals, but because
free exchange between individuals tends to maximize value. Value is
determined by the free preferences of individuals, so if two persons
voluntarily arrange an exchange, say, money for goods, then both individuals' preferences will be satisfied; both will get something more
valuable to them; and value will be maximized.
Thus, according to the economic theory the primary purpose of
contract law (indeed, all law) is to maximize value. The test for rules
of contractual liability is whether they "will create incentives for
value-maximizing conduct in the future.15 Thus, the requirement of
consideration for a contract is explained on the ground that without
it no exchange occurs (so value cannot be increased) or the courts
have no way of determining whether the transaction would max-

Id. at 1.
5. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
4.
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imize value.6 The defenses of fraud and duress can also be explained
as rebutting the presumption that the exchange would maximize
value.' Finally, most of the traditional rules of damages can be explained as maximizing value.8 The plaintiff should receive expectation damages so that the defendant breaches only when he or she
can make enough from an alternative arrangement to compensate
the plaintiff. No penal damages are imposed because that would
discourage a person from breaching a contract when more value
could be realized by breach and compensation. Similarly, a plaintiff
should have a duty to mitigate damages, for otherwise resources
will be wasted, that is, not used to maximize value.
One would expect an economic theory to explain much of contract law, for it is predominantly the law of the market. It has
become popular to challenge the economic theory as a justification
of contract and other law. Obviously, even if it does provide a good
second level explanation of contract law, this need not amount to a
justification of contract law. In particular, value maximization need
not be one's only or even main concern. One might also be concerned
with equality of distribution. The expression "value maximization"
obscures an important point, namely, that the primary value in question is wealth. Other values are included only insofar as they are
part of the preferences of the parties to the exchange. And a
preference for equality by a poor party to a projected exchange is
not likely to be reflected in the resulting bargain, say, in a lower
price. Consequently, while economic theory might fulfill the function
of second level explanation reasonably well, it is not likely to fulfill
the function of justification well.
A promise theory and an economic theory might differ with
respect to penal damages. If the purpose of contract law is to enforce promises, then it might be plausible to invoke penal damages
to encourage people to fulfill their promises. Fried does not discuss
penal damages, but he does support expectation damages when they
exceed reliance costs as taking persons and their assumptions of
obligations seriously.9 Penal damages might also be imposed, it
seems, to encourage trust and make people take their assumptions
of obligations seriously. However, while an economic theory supports expectation damages, it would never support penal damages,
because they would prevent value maximization.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 88-93.
C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-1.
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Relational Analysis
According to relational theory, economic analysis best applies
to a form of contract that is becoming less important in modern
society. Contracts occur along a spectrum of relations between people, varying from quick, one time transactions between strangers at
one end (the purchase of gasoline at a distant independent station)
to indefinitely continuing relationships at the other (employment or
marriage). Although all contracts involve some more complex set of
relationships between the parties and contracts fall on a continuum,
frequently relational theorists speak of two contrasting types-discrete transactions and relational contracts. Different goals are involved in these two types of contracts and they involve different
norms. The elements of exchange and choice keep contract distinct
from tort law, which also deals with the relationships between people.10
Ian Macneil has set out the different norms which he claims are
involved in these two types of contracts." Discrete transactions are
governed by a norm calling for planning and bringing the future into
the present on the basis of consent. One might say that the discrete
norm promotes abstractness; that is, it ignores the identities of the
parties and tries to eliminate temporal differences. In contrast, the
relational norms promote concreteness by emphasizing role integrity
(which partly defines the parties), preservation of the relation
(rather than viewing it as a one time matter), harmonization or elimination of conflicts in the relation, and consideration of "supracontract" norms (noncontract norms that apply to the relationship).
Elsewhere Macneil analyzes the values involved in the norms
for these types of contracts."2 He contends that relational analysis is
value neutral in the sense that different societies will instantiate the
norms in their own social contexts. Thus, relational analysis does
not necessarily imply a commitment to liberalism. Instead, the
norms are ones that must generally be involved if exchange relations are to occur. Not each norm must be fully realized in each contract, but in general practice these norms must be followed.
It thus becomes clear that relational analysis, like economic
analysis, emphasizes second level explanation. The norms are not

10.

11.
12.
-

. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 50.
Id. at 59-70.
Macneil, Values in Contract- Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.

(1983).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 1
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

capable of justifying contract law, because they are descriptive.
Although Macneil claims that the norms not only describe the way
people behave "but the way they ought to behave," at best they
describe how people think they ought to behave. 3 The norms are
hypothetical; if one wants to preserve relations, then one ought to
behave in such and such a manner. The norms describe "the
behavior that does occur in relations, must occur if relations are to
continue, and hence ought to occur so long as their continuance is
valued."" If one wants to end a relationship (employment, marriage),
then one need not be concerned to conform to the norms.
The relational theory is more of a framework for legal analysis
than a theory for a specific legal system. As. B. J. Reiter notes in
his paper in this symposium, it is like an engine waiting to be
powered. One must add the particular social relations of a society
before one can draw any particular conclusions. As such, relational
theory can explain exchange relations in any society. This is another
reason why it is incapable of providing justifications.
In his paper in this symposium, Philip Mullock tries to provide
an alternative perspective on the same phenomena the relational
theory addresses. He wants to look at relations from the point of
view of participants in them, which he calls a hermeneutical approach. Mullock develops the concepts of conventional action and
conventions to explain exchange relations. Conventional action is
more inclusive than promising, so by implication Mullock also rejects promise theories of contract law. Obligations can arise from
conventional actions without promises, although the obligations are
not as strong or inclusive as those arising from promises. Although
Mullock does not develop the point in great detail, he notes that his
theory provides a basis for contractual damages that do not go to
the full extent of expectation damages.
Reasonable Expectations
Another recent theory of contract law contends that "the fundamental purpose of contract law is the protection and promotion of
expectations reasonably created by contract."' 5 Because two parties
are involved, only those expectations of which the other party was
or should have been aware are to be protected.' On such a theory,
13.
14.
15.

I. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 38.
Id. at 64; see also id. at 59.
Reiter & Swan, Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations,

in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 6 (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds. 1980).
16. Id. at 7.
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the existence of a contract itself may become a secondary consideration, for the primary one will be to protect and promote reasonable
expectations arising out of relations. (Thus, the theory is closely connected to the relational theory.) The existence of a traditional contract is only one factor to consider in deciding to impose liability,
and then only because it affects reasonable reliance and expectations. A person should be held liable when that person should
realize that another might reasonably rely to his or her detriment or
entertain reasonable expectations on the basis of the first person's
conduct. 7 Thus, tort and contract law tend to merge. Traditional
contracts only establish or acknowledge relations from which
reasonable reliance and expectations arise.
In his paper in this symposium, Reiter explores the significance
of a requirement of good faith for contract theory. He argues that
an adequate theory will be two-tiered, that is, have some very
general principles at one level and more specific principles at a
lower level. Contracts derive their binding force or moral justification from community views. Moreover, contract law cannot be sharply separated from other areas of law. Reiter then explores the importance of these and other points for Fried's view of contract as
promise.
The crux of a reasonable expectations theory is how one determines what expectations and reliance are reasonable. Cases often involve differing expectations of the parties, and courts must decide
which set to enforce. Thus, one needs a method to determine which
expectations are reasonable or justified. 8 The usual approach, which
Reiter adopts, is to look to express commitments in contracts, clear
implications from the wording of the contract, or the general practice in such activities. Although contractors can mutually recognize
almost any obligations by their contractual promises, in the final
analysis even the expectations and reliance arising from them depend on accepted norms requiring the fulfillment of promises. Consequently, the ultimate standards for reasonable expectations and
reliance are accepted community norms.
The question then arises whether such a theory can have a
justificatory function. Particular legal decisions and doctrines can be
justified by reference to the agreement of the parties to the contract and accepted social norms (including holding people to the ar-

17. Reiter, Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance in
LAW 242 (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds. 1980).
18. P. ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 67-8.
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rangements they accept). However, can one justify the accepted
social norms? Obviously, any such justification is apt to be complex.
One is apt to have a form of positivism, namely, the function of law
is to provide fair and just enforcement of certain social norms,
whatever they might be, in order to promote a smoothly functioning
society (or whatever). This type of justification differs significantly
from Fried's argument for the promise principle, for Fried claims
that the promise principle is justified for any society.
Another potential difficulty for the reasonable expectations
theory is that expectations and reliance appear to point to different
contract damages. In a classic paper, Lon Fuller and William Perdue
-argued that reliance can be the basis for justifying damages yet expectation be the basis for determining the amount of damages.'9
Essentially, in contracting with one party a person relies on that
person and forgoes opportunities to contract with others. In the
final paper in this symposium, Richard Bronaugh examines the
possible import of lost opportunities for contract damages. In particular, he criticizes the Fuller and Perdue argument. One cannot,
Bronaugh argues, rely on a promise by the other party in contract
formation, for no promise exists until the offer has been accepted.
Thus, one cannot rely on a promise in accepting the offer.
CONCLUSION

What, if anything, hinges on these different theories. As the
discussion of the functions of theory sought to indicate, they will
agree about the solution to many contract cases. If P orders 1000
widgets from D but D ships only 500, then P is entitled to expectation damages. This result ensues whether one argues on the basis of
agreement, promise, economic value maximization, relational theory,
or reasonable expectations. Similarly, they all imply that if D enters
a contract under duress, D need not perform. The core and clear
cases of contract law will likely remain untouched no matter which
of these theories one adopts.
This does not mean that the theories imply the same solutions
in all cases. Significant differences arise in borderline cases. For example, they might not provide the same solution to a case of mutual
mistake as in Sherwood v. Walker.'° In that case, Walker sold Sherwood a presumably barren cow, but the cow turned out to be fertile
19.

Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract, 46 YALE L.J. 52

20.

66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).

(1936).
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and worth much more than the contract price. Walker thereupon
refused to deliver the cow to Sherwood. Fried considers mutual mistake to vitiate the contract." An economic analysis, however, would
be concerned to allocate the risks that the cow is fertile so as to
maximize value; the seller should probably assume the risk of a barren cow being fertile because the seller is in a better position to
know.' A reasonable expectations approach would probably come to
the same conclusion for essentially the same reasons.'
In other cases, the economic and reasonable expectations
theories might differ. For example, the economic theory would imply
warranties only if the seller could most cheaply detect and provide
for the eventuality. However, community expectations might not be
the most efficient; that is, the community might well expect a party
to assume liability even if that party is not in the best position to do
so efficiently. To the extent a reasonable expectations theory
evaluates reasonableness by community standards and they are not
the most efficient, it will differ from the economic theory. At this
point it is tempting for a reasonable: expectations theorist to argue
that community expectations are not reasonable. If one makes that
argument, then it is not accepted community norms that ultimately
count, but some notion of reasonableness that is independent of community norms'. This will greatly change the type of justification such
a theory can provide for contract law. It then becomes less culturally
relative and more of the sort Fried attempts to provide.
At this point, one must return to the functions of a contract
theory. The crucial question is what one wants a theory for. Until
one becomes clear what one wants a theory to do, arguments for
and against one or the other are often confused and misplaced. For
example, if one wants a theory to provide a moral justification of
contract law, then criticisms that Fried's promise theory does not
comprehend as much of contract behavior as does Macneil's relational theory are simply misplaced. Similarly, if one wants a theory
to explain the role of contract behavior in society, arguments that
Macneil's relational theory does not provide an adequate justification are irrelevant. Many theorists hope to provide a theory that
fulfills all three functions, but there is no a priori reason to believe
this is possible. Indeed, unless one assumes that the law is always as
good as possible, it is a priori implausible that a theory that proC. FRIED, supra note 1, at 59.
R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 73-4.
Swan, The Allocation of Risk in the Analysis of Mistake and Frustration,
in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 201-04 (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds. 1980).
21.
22.
23.
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vides an adequate explanation will also provide a satisfactory
justification.
Does this mean that several theories can be correct? Yes, it
does, but "correct" is relative to purposes - a correct prediction, a
correct explanation, or a correct justification. Nor can one clearly
argue that one function has precedence over the others. Unless it is
justified, the law is an ass. But any justification that ignores how
the law functions in society at both the general level and as perceived
by participants in the legal system (judges and lawyers) will be irrelevant to society and merely an ass of another color. Thus, an adequate justificatory theory must rest upon an adequate explanatory
one. But if one wants to promote the well-being of citizens, one will
need a justificatory theory to know that one is doing good, not
harm. In this sense, and this sense only, the justificatory function of
legal theory is primary.
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